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I. INTRODUCTION
PEOPLE have been killing other people ever since Cain slew Abel.1And people have been punished for killing ever since God pun-ished Cain.2 Well, at least that is the biblical version. Regardless of
its origins, killing another human being—and aiding others in taking their
own lives—has long been regarded—or perhaps has always been re-
garded—as an offense not only against the victim but against society as a
whole. These basic beliefs are the historical, cultural, and psychological
context in which the practice of assisted dying must be viewed and
understood.
II. TERMINOLOGY
To understand the history of assisted dying in the United States, it is
first useful, if not necessary, to understand the terminology used to de-
scribe this phenomenon, in large part because the terminology is so va-
ried, sometimes fraught with emotion, occasionally overlapping, and
sometimes contradictory.
What are we talking about when we talk about assisted dying? The
general term we use to refer to killing another human being is homicide.3
This term carries no moral connotations—that is, no connotations of legal
or ethical wrongdoing.4 Homicide includes the crimes of murder and
manslaughter,5 but not all killings are criminal. Some instances of killing
are legally, if not always morally, justifiable or excusable (terms which
themselves have distinct meanings in law).6 Capital punishment, self-de-
fense, defense of another, killing caused by mental illness, and killing in
war are some of the categories in which the killing of another person is
not necessarily criminal.7 These are, depending on the circumstances, ex-
amples of possibly legal homicide.
In any discussion of the meaning of assisted dying, there also needs to
be an exploration of the different meanings of suicide. Literally, the word
suicide means self-killing, the taking of one’s own life.8 During some peri-
ods of American history, the law has treated suicide as an offense against
society, and during some periods of English history, English law—the
source of the American common law of suicide—has treated failed sui-
cide as a crime and successful suicide as an offense against the state, lead-
ing to the imposition of penalties on the body, the estate, or both of the
1. Genesis 4:8.
2. Id. at 4:10.
3. Homicide, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., id. at Justifiable Homicide.
7. See, e.g., id.
8. Id. at Suicide.
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deceased.9 To further confuse things, at some times and in some places,
assisted (or, as it is sometimes termed, aiding) suicide has been classified
as a type of homicide.10
These are the general outlines of the law from which contemporary
American law has developed around the practice of assisted dying. But in
addition to these legal terms, there are a number of other related terms
which are not legal terms per se but which affect the understanding of the
current debate about the legalization of assisted dying. The more impor-
tant of these terms are:
1) Euthanasia. From the Greek, literally meaning “good death,” eu-
thanasia refers to the practice of ending a person’s life for profess-
edly compassionate or merciful reasons11—hence the frequently
used synonym mercy killing.12 Euthanasia usually refers to ending
another’s life but is sometimes also used to refer to the practice of
providing assistance to another who seeks to end his own life to es-
cape (i.e., assisting suicide) from the burdens of some illness, injury,
or disability.13 Occasionally, the term euthanasia includes suicide by
one seeking to end his own life for the same reasons.14
2) Voluntary, involuntary, nonvoluntary euthanasia. Euthanasia may
be voluntary—which denotes that the person whose life is ended
consented to it.15 It may be involuntary—denoting that the practice
is opposed by the person whose life is ended.16 It may be
nonvoluntary, in which case the person whose life is ended has no
ability to approve or disapprove of what is to happen to him because
of cognitive impairment.17 There may be total impairment because
of unconsciousness or partial impairment, such as profound demen-
tia, in which case the person may be aware but unable to either con-
sent or refuse.18
3) Active euthanasia. This phrase refers to the kind of euthanasia in
which some “act” is taken to end a person’s life.19 In the contempo-
rary context, it usually refers to the direct administration of a lethal
dose of a medication by injection or infusion to a terminally ill pa-
tient.20 However, the phrase active euthanasia also sometimes in-
cludes the provision of a lethal dose of medication or the writing of a
prescription for such a dose to a terminally ill patient with the pa-
9. Helen Silving, Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U. PA. L.
REV. 350, 370 (1954).
10. See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690, 693 (Mich. 1920), overruled by People v.
Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 738–39 (Mich. 1994).




15. Id. at Voluntary Euthanasia.
16. Id. at Involuntary Euthanasia.
17. Id. at Nonvoluntary Euthanasia.
18. Id.
19. Id. at Active Euthanasia.
20. See id.
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tient self-administering the lethal agent.21 However, it is preferable
to refer to the latter as a “physician-assisted suicide” or “physician-
aided dying” (or similar terms) when the party providing the medica-
tion or prescription is a physician,22 or merely “assisted suicide” or
“assisted dying” when the party is not a physician—preferable be-
cause of the moral connotation associated with causation.23 In the
former instance (i.e., direct administration), the physician or other
third party is the direct cause of the patient’s death,24 whereas in the
latter, the patient is the direct cause and the physician or other third
party is a more remote actor in the chain of causation.25 The phrase
active euthanasia is also sometimes used to refer to an act that ends a
patient’s treatment, such as removing medical life support from a pa-
tient, but as will be seen, this is more properly referred to as “passive
euthanasia.”26
4) Aid-in-dying; assisted dying. These terms are increasingly used to
refer to the practices referred to previously as assisted suicide or
physician-assisted-suicide, as a way of avoiding the negative connota-
tions associated with the term suicide.27
5) Passive euthanasia, letting die. These phrases are used synony-
mously to refer to a variety of practices that involve forgoing life-
sustaining medical treatment for a patient who is terminally ill, criti-
cally ill, permanently unconscious, or who fits some similar descrip-
tion.28 They can include both stopping a treatment that is already in
progress or not starting a treatment that might prolong the patient’s
life.29 Stopping treatment is sometimes referred to as “withdrawing
treatment,” and not starting is sometimes referred to as “withholding
treatment.”30
Although American case law sometimes uses the letting die terminol-
ogy,31 it is rare that the term passive euthanasia is used.32 Although with-
drawing treatment sometimes involves the performance of an act,
American law still does not consider it to be active euthanasia.33 That
term is reserved exclusively for the practice of administering a lethal
agent to a patient (or, as previously discussed, it is occasionally applied to
21. See id.
22. Physician-Assisted Suicide, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY.
23. Id. at Assisted Suicide.
24. Id. at Physician-Assisted Suicide.
25. Id. at Assisted Suicide.
26. Id. at Passive Suicide.
27. Terminology of Assisted Dying, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://
www.deathwithdignity.org/terminology [https://perma.cc/CH25-YVD4] (last visited Nov. 7,
2019).
28. Passive Euthanasia, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 806 (1997).
32. But see Myers v. Schneiderman, 30 N.Y.3d 1, 35–36 (N.Y. 2017) (Fahey, J.,
concurring).
33. See, e.g., Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 82 (N.Y. 1990).
2020] History of the Law of Assisted Dying 123
providing the patient with the lethal agent or a prescription to obtain that
agent).34
My focus here is the history of efforts in the United States to legalize
voluntary, physician-aided dying—that is, a physician providing a patient
(or someone acting on behalf of a patient) with a prescription for a lethal
dose of medication intended for the patient to self-administer.35 The pa-
tient must possess decision-making capacity and make the request
voluntarily.36
That is not to say that proposals have never been made to legalize
nonvoluntary or even involuntary aid-in-dying (with the assistance of
physicians, other health care professionals, lay people, or a class of per-
sons designated by law to carry out such tasks),37 but such proposals are
so far out of the mainstream that they are not currently worthy of discus-
sion. Furthermore, although there has been some public debate about
making physician-aided dying available for persons who are not termi-
nally ill, those too have not gained any traction in the legalization move-
ment and therefore are not the subject of discussion here. I will also
discuss passive euthanasia because the development of the law in this
area is critical to an understanding of the legalization of physician-aided
dying and not because it is considered to be a form of physician-aided
dying.
III. HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CRIMINAL HOMICIDE
Historically, under American law and its English antecedent, homi-
cide—the killing of another person—is prima facie the crime of murder
or manslaughter.38 However, as previously discussed, not all killings of
another human being are criminal.39 The important defenses to homicide
are rarely relevant in this context. However, three other aspects of the
law of homicide are relevant to the current discussion; they are motive,
consent, and the shortening of life’s duration.
First, in determining whether a killing is criminal, it is generally ac-
cepted that the motive of the killer is irrelevant.40 Motive may be rele-
vant in the determination of an appropriate punishment, but it is not
34. Id.; Active Euthanasia, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY.
35. Id. at Physician-Assisted Suicide.
36. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2017).
37. See, e.g., ‘Legalize Euthanasia’ Says Expert, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
health/5056326.stm [https://perma.cc/F45M-ALW5] (last updated June 8, 2006).
38. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 1980).
39. See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text.
40. Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.6, at 243 (3d ed. 2000) (“One who intentionally kills another
human being is guilty of murder, though he does so at the victim’s request and his motive is
the worthy one of terminating the victim’s suffering from an incurable and painful dis-
ease.”); ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 927–29 (3d ed. 1982).
However, motive may play an informal role in mitigating the criminal process. LAFAVE,
supra, § 3.6, at 245 (“[T]he existence of a good motive on the part of the guilty person may
be taken into account wherever there is room for the exercise of discretion in the proceed-
ings against that person.”).
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relevant to whether or not a crime has, in the first instance, been commit-
ted.41 Thus, the fact that in killing another, one is motivated by the desire
to confer a benefit on the other person—for instance, to be merciful by
relieving that person’s suffering, no matter how extreme the suffering is—
cannot be taken into account in determining whether the killer has com-
mitted a crime.
Second, consent is not a defense to criminal homicide—i.e., to a charge
of murder or manslaughter.42 That is, if the person who is killed consents
to having his life ended, a crime has still been committed, assuming that
all the other elements of the offense have been established.43 Indeed,
even if the killing takes place at the request of the person who is killed,
regardless of the reason, and even if the person is fully mentally compe-
tent, consent is not a legally valid defense.44 Thus, at least in theory,
mercy killing is always a crime. Whether in fact the killer will be subject
to punishment is another matter, which will be discussed later.
Finally, the fact that the person whose life is taken was already dying,
or was even very close to death, does not excuse the killer.45 Shortening a
person’s life by killing, no matter what the expected duration of the life
was, is still prima facie criminal.46
A. THE LAWS OF SUICIDE AND ATTEMPTED SUICIDE
For obvious reasons, suicide has never been a crime in the same sense
that homicide is. Nonetheless, English common law imposed penalties on
people who attempted suicide but failed, and it even imposed penalties
on the interests of people who successfully committed suicide.47 At-
tempted suicide was (and still is) seen as a sign of what was then called
insanity, and those who unsuccessfully attempted it were usually treated
in the same manner as others who were considered to be insane.48 To
some extent, that is also the case today.49 A failed suicide attempt can be
a ticket to involuntary psychiatric hospitalization.
Those who successfully committed suicide were, at common law, de-
nied burial in consecrated ground.50 In fact, at some times, those who
committed suicide were subjected to ignominious burial, which involved
41. Id.
42. Edinburgh v. State, 896 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); People v.
Cleaves, 280 Cal. Rptr. 146, 151 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); see LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 5.11, at
516; PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 40, at 1075.
43. LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 5.11, at 516.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486–87.
46. Id. at 487.
47. See State v. Willis, 121 S.E.2d 854, 855 (N.C. 1961).
48. McElwee v. Ferguson, 43 Md. 479, 480 (Md. 1876) (noting that attempted suicide is
regarded by some to be “a positive sign or symptom of insanity”); Alex B. Long, Abolish-
ing the Suicide Rule, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 767, 775–76 (2019).
49. Long, supra note 48, at 776 (“Suicide is still often linked with mental illness in the
minds of many Americans . . . .”).
50. See G. Steven Neeley, Self-Directed Death, Euthanasia, and the Termination of
Life-Support: Reasonable Decisions to Die, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 205, 209–10 (1994).
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burial in a road with a stake driven through their hearts.51 At a time when
church and state were far less separate than they are today, such a result
had religious sanctions, as well as the force of law.52 Indeed, religious
belief was the source of the legal sanction, originating in even earlier
times when ecclesiastical law and secular law were a unitary form of so-
cial control.53 Furthermore, if successful suicides had any property, their
estates were subject to escheat; that is, their heirs were denied their in-
heritance and the estate passed to the crown instead.54 If this result were
ever the law in the American colonies, it ended very early in the nation’s
existence.
B. THE LAW OF ASSISTED SUICIDE
The way in which the common law treated those who assisted another
in committing suicide was not nearly as straightforward, nor as certain, as
the way in which it treated homicide, attempted suicide, and suicide.
Some jurisdictions viewed assisted suicide as a form of criminal homicide,
and the perpetrator could be tried as if he had actually killed the victim.55
Others viewed the person assisting in the suicide as an accessory to the
crime of homicide with the likelihood of the imposition of a lesser penalty
than if the perpetrator was viewed as a killer.56 Other jurisdictions cre-
ated a separate crime of assisted suicide.57 And still others—such as
Michigan—have refused to criminally convict those who aid another to
commit suicide, which is why Dr. Jack Kevorkian was not successfully
prosecuted for the suicides that he assisted in Michigan in the 1990s.58
IV. THE MODERN AMERICAN LAWS OF HOMICIDE,
SUICIDE, ATTEMPTED SUICIDE, AND ASSISTED
SUICIDE
The laws of homicide, suicide, attempted suicide, and assisted suicide
are almost exclusively a matter of the law of the individual states rather
than federal law. Consequently, the laws vary from state to state. None-
theless, there are some features common to many aspects of the relevant
law.
Homicide. The basic outlines of the law of homicide have changed very
little from the common law. Most state criminal law is now encompassed
in statutes enacted by each state legislature, but it does not deviate
51. See Silving, supra note 9, at 370.
52. See Neeley, supra note 50, at 209.
53. See id. at 209–10.
54. See id. at 209.
55. See Derrick Augustus Carter, Knight in the Duel with Death: Physician Assisted
Suicide and the Medical Necessity Defense, 41 VILL. L. REV. 663, 702 n.56 (1996).
56. Id. at 678.
57. Id. at 702 n.56.
58. See, e.g., Elizabeth Gmyrek, Comment, The Debate on Physician-Assisted Suicide
Reaches the Federal Courts: A Discussion on the Decisions of the District and Circuit Courts
in Compassion in Dying v. Washington State, 16 PACE L. REV. 359, 368 (1996).
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greatly from the traditional judge-made law of homicide. Although each
state has its own statutory law, not only of homicide but of all crimes,
there is a great similarity among the states because of mid-twentieth cen-
tury efforts, led by the American Law Institute, which promulgated a
Model Penal Code.59 This code is not law; rather it is, as its name sug-
gests, a model law, which only acquires the force of law if adopted by a
particular state’s legislature.60 Even then, each legislature may make
modifications to the model code including the rejection of certain
provisions.61
For present purposes, what is most relevant is the same matter dis-
cussed relating to the common law of homicide, namely, that motive is
not relevant to whether or not a crime has been committed.62 As a result,
mercy killing remains criminal, consent is not a defense, and the shorten-
ing of a dying person’s life by ending it also remains criminal.
Suicide. Unlike the law of homicide, the contemporary law of suicide
has changed considerably from the common law. No state now considers
suicide to be a criminal offense (nor does British law).63 The practices of
ignominious burial and escheat were relegated to the scrap heap of legal
history over the course of the nineteenth century.64
Attempted suicide. Attempted suicide, however, is still of concern to the
law, and it is now considered a matter of public health, usually dealt with
by civil statutory and case law, rather than criminal law.65 Many states
deal with attempted suicide under their mental health laws, which may
lead to involuntary confinement in a mental health facility or involuntary
treatment as an outpatient.66 Although there are no statistics maintained
on this matter, it is unlikely that a person nearing death from a medical
condition will be subjected to involuntary psychiatric hospitalization for a
failed suicide attempt. However, it is probably more likely that a person
with a terminal condition who is not actually close to death will, in the
aftermath of a failed suicide attempt, be offered psychiatric treatment or
even possibly subjected to involuntary inpatient or outpatient treatment.
Assisted suicide. With the exception of those few states (to be discussed
later) that have legalized physician-aided dying, aiding another person to
end his life—even a terminally ill person and even a terminally ill person
who is close to death—remains a criminal offense in all the other states.67
59. Model Penal Code, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
60. See Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler’s Predecessors, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1098, 1144 (1978).
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
63. LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 7.8, at 699.
64. See generally Long, supra note 48, at 775–77 (summarizing changes in societal
views of suicide from the eighteenth to the twentieth century).
65. Thomas J. Marzen et al., “Suicide: A Constitutional Right?”—Reflections Eleven
Years Later, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 261, 265–66 (1996).
66. Carter, supra note 55, at 675.
67. For a list of states that do not criminalize physician-aided dying, see Death with
Dignity Acts, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/learn/death-with-
dignity-acts/ [https://perma.cc/9BNS-8VMN] (last visited Sept. 11, 2019).
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Even in those states that have legalized physician-aided dying, aiding an-
other to end his life outside of the strict requirements of the aid-in-dying
law is still a criminal offense.68 That is, a person who is not a physician
but otherwise conforms to the aid-in-dying law is subject to prosecution,
as is a physician who fails to comply with the legal requirements for phy-
sician-aided dying.69 That is not to say that very many prosecutions occur
of people who aid another, especially if the person aided is terminally ill,
but the laws making such assistance a crime remain on the books and are
occasionally enforced, enough such that they probably deter many people
from rendering such assistance no matter how merciful it might be to do
so. Because aiding suicide remains illegal, it is also extremely difficult to
know how frequently it is practiced either by physicians or laypeople.
V. EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE FOR THE
TERMINALLY ILL
Despite the legal prohibitions on euthanasia and aiding another in
committing suicide—or more likely because of them—efforts began in
the twentieth century to enact laws to legalize either or both of these
practices. Separate proposals differed in their goals. Some sought to le-
galize voluntary mercy killing while others mixed voluntary and involun-
tary euthanasia. Some sought to legalize mercy killing, others simply
sought to legalize assisted suicide, and others sought to legalize both.
A. NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
Although it is likely that mercy killing and assisted suicide have been
contemplated, discussed, and written about since time immemorial, mod-
ern discussions of the subject gained momentum in the latter half of the
nineteenth century.70 In the early 1870s, a contentious debate in Britain
reprised the arguments for and against legalization of voluntary euthana-
sia,71 and at the end of the nineteenth century, the debate “had become a
topic of speeches at medical meetings and editorials in British and Ameri-
can medical journals.”72
A full-blown debate erupted in the 1930s in the United Kingdom, fol-
lowed in short order in the United States, and it resurfaced in both coun-
tries after World War II.73 Although these proposals were for voluntary
euthanasia, they sprang from contentious ideas, proposals, and actual leg-
68. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.890 (2017).
69. See, e.g., id.
70. See infra note 71.
71. See generally Lionel A. Tollemache, The New Cure for Incurables, 19 FORT-
NIGHTLY REV. 218 (1873); Euthanasia, POPULAR SCI. MONTHLY, May 1, 1873, at 93; Mr.
Tollemache on the Right to Die, SPECTATOR, Feb. 15, 1873, at 10; Lionel A. Tollemache,
The Limits of Euthanasia, SPECTATOR, Feb. 22, 1873, at 12 (letter to the editor).
72. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Euthanasia—Historical, Ethical, and Empiric Perspectives, 154
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1890, 1892 (1994).
73. Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed Mercy-Killing Legisla-
tion, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969, 969 n.3 (1958).
128 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
islation dealing with eugenics and involuntary sterilization in the United
States in the first two decades of the twentieth century.74 A number of
states enacted laws permitting involuntary sterilization of the “mentally
unfit,” a practice that was constitutionality upheld in the infamous 1927
U.S. Supreme Court case of Buck v. Bell in which Justice Holmes penned
the now immortal phrase, “Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”75
In Germany, similar concerns were voiced, leading to the adoption of a
law modeled on the Virginia statute that had been ruled constitutional in
Buck.76 In addition, there was popular enthusiasm in Germany for eutha-
nasia of people suffering from incurable illness, including mental illness,
and for euthanasia of “severely retarded and defective children.”77 After
the Nazi party came to power, such euthanasia policies became wide-
spread.78 One commentator has observed that “Hitler’s authorization was
not so much a command but an extension of ‘the authority of physicians
. . . so that a mercy death may be granted to patients . . . .’”79 This oc-
curred even before the establishment of concentration camps and the
practice of mass killing of those groups thought to be inimical to the well-
being of German society and culture.80 And “[e]ven as late as 1944, se-
verely malformed adults [in Germany] were being brought for ‘euthana-
sia’ at the request of their families.”81
A movement to legalize euthanasia also began to develop in the United
States in the 1930s.82 However, this kind of euthanasia was far different
from what was contemplated and eventually practiced in Germany.83 The
motivation in the United States was to relieve the suffering of terminally
ill patients,84 rather than eugenics. This was reflected primarily in the fact
that it would only be available to adults who were in possession of deci-
sion-making capacity.85 In 1932, the Voluntary Euthanasia Legalisation
Society was founded in the United Kingdom, and six years later a similar
organization, the Euthanasia Society of America, came into existence in
the United States.86 A bill fashioned by the British organization was in-
troduced in the House of Lords in 1936 permitting a person over the age
of twenty-one who was suffering from an incurable and fatal disease to
74. See Emanuel, supra note 72, at 1892 n.35.
75. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
76. Influence of Virginia’s Eugenical Sterilization Act, UVA CLAUDE MOORE HEALTH
SCI. LIBR., http://exhibits.hsl.virginia.edu/eugenics/4-influence/ [https://perma.cc/3BNU-
T5HV] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
77. D. Alan Shewmon, Active Voluntary Euthanasia: A Needless Pandora’s Box, 3 IS-
SUES L. & MED. 219, 227–28 (1987).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 228 (quoting FREDRIC WERTHAM, A SIGN FOR CAIN: AN EXPLORATION OF
HUMAN VIOLENCE 162 (1973)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Kamisar, supra note 73, at 969 n.3.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 975, 978.
85. Id. at 978–79.
86. Edward J. Gurney, Is There a Right To Die?—A Study of the Law of Euthanasia, 3
CUMB.-SAMFORD L. REV. 235, 237 (1972).
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request to be euthanized by a physician after specified medical examina-
tion and certification and approval by a special court.87 The bill was de-
bated but not enacted.88 A similar bill was introduced in the Nebraska
legislature a year later, and it too was not enacted.89
B. THE RENEWAL OF THE DEBATE, POST-WORLD WAR II
During World War II, legislation to legalize euthanasia got sidelined in
both the United States and the United Kingdom.90 However, it again rose
to the surface in the post-war era, though against a decidedly different
backdrop.91 The Nazi euthanasia program and death camps cast a long
shadow over post-war discussions of the legalization of euthanasia for ter-
minally ill patients. The post-war debate was initiated by Glanville Wil-
liams, an eminent British professor of jurisprudence at the University of
Cambridge. His book, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, pub-
lished in 1958, was primarily responsible for an upsurge of interest in the
legalization of euthanasia.92 That is not to say that others had not contrib-
uted to the debate. According to Professor Yale Kamisar, who later
played an extremely influential role in the post-war debate about legali-
zation, the following literature played important roles in the debate, in
support of legalization: an article co-authored by an eminent American
law professor at Columbia University, Herbert Wechsler; another article
by the British intellectual, G. K. Chesterton; and a book by the German
criminologist, Hermann Mannheim.93
Kamisar, then a young law professor at the University of Minnesota
and destined to become a leading scholar of criminal law, was probably
the foremost opponent—at least in this early portion of the debate—and
has remained an outspoken and prolific opponent of the legalization of
any form of actively hastening death. Williams and Kamisar engaged in a
scholarly exchange—beginning with Williams’s book, continuing with a
lengthy rebuttal by Kamisar in a law review article,94 followed by a re-
joinder from Williams95—which more or less established the terms of the
debate from then until the present time. Williams’s rationale for legaliza-
tion was humanitarian—to provide release from suffering of the termi-
nally ill when there was no alternative to death.96 Kamisar, while
sympathetic to that rationale, nonetheless opposed legalization for a
number of reasons, his primary fear being that, once legalized for a nar-
rowly defined set of circumstances, it would inevitably expand, possibly
87. Id. at 251–52.
88. Id. at 252.
89. Id.
90. See Emanuel, supra note 72, at 1892.
91. See id.
92. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1958).
93. Kamisar, supra note 73, at 970, 976 n.26.
94. See generally id.
95. Glanville Williams, “Mercy-Killing” Legislation—A Rejoinder, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1
(1958).
96. See, e.g., id. at 1.
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even to include involuntary euthanasia.97 This fear, of course, had the
recent historical precedent of involuntary American sterilization and in-
voluntary Nazi sterilization and euthanasia to help make the case.
One important thing to note about the early post-World War II debate
is that it focused on “the cancer victim begging for death,” not the “the
involuntary variety, that is, the case of the congenital idiot, the perma-
nently insane or the senile.”98 That too, no doubt, was the result of the
events in Germany preceding and including the Nazi era. This, in effect,
took involuntary euthanasia off the table, and it has remained off the
table in all subsequent legislative proposals, not only in the United States
but in all European countries.99
C. THE EFFECT OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND THE
“RIGHT TO DIE”
The now-famous case of Karen Ann Quinlan, commencing in 1975,
marked the beginning of a new era in the law of end-of-life decisions.100
In that year, Karen, a young woman in New Jersey, became unconscious
after consuming drugs and drinking alcohol.101 As a result, she stopped
breathing.102 Emergency medical technicians were summoned, and she
was transported to a hospital where she was put on a mechanical ventila-
tor to restore her respiration and circulation.103 Because too much time
had elapsed between the time she stopped breathing and its restoration,
she suffered brain damage so severe that she was eventually diagnosed as
being in a persistent vegetative state.104 This meant (at least at that time)
that she would never regain consciousness and would remain in a state
where she experienced nothing—no cognition, no awareness of her envi-
ronment, no perception of any sort.105
Because of this dire prognosis, her parents raised the question about
whether life support (in this case, a ventilator) should be continued or
whether it should be withdrawn with the inevitable consequence that she
97. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 73, at 976.
98. Id. at 969 (emphasis in original).
99. Although only voluntary euthanasia has been legalized in a number of western
European countries, there are periodic reports that involuntary euthanasia is practiced
nonetheless. See, e.g., Review of Countries Where Euthanasia Has Been Legalised. Increas-
ing Involuntary Euthanasia, Without Consent by Patients, BIOETHICS OBSERVATORY (Aug.
15, 2017), http://www.bioethicsobservatory.org/2017/08/euthanasia-in-patients-who-have-
not-requested-it/12046 [https://perma.cc/555P-5CT5]. Whether or not abuse was occurring
in the Netherlands was a matter of dispute among the Justices in Washington v. Gluck-
sberg. Compare Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997), with Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 786 (Souter, J., concurring) (“There is, however, a substantial dispute today about
what the Dutch experience shows.”).
100. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
101. In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 806 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).
102. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 653–54.
103. Id. at 654.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 655.
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would die.106 The Quinlans were concerned not only with the medical
aspects of the situation but also with the moral ones.107 As Roman
Catholics, they consulted their priest and were advised that termination
of life-sustaining treatment would not be inconsistent with Catholic
teachings.108 Based on this religious perspective and on medical opinions
the Quinlans obtained about Karen’s prognosis, they requested that their
daughter’s physicians discontinue the ventilator that was keeping her
alive so she could die peacefully.109
The physicians refused this request, both out of their concern for po-
tential legal liability for causing Karen’s death and because of their view
that allowing her to die would violate medical ethics.110 Karen’s parents
were thus left either to accede to the doctors’ views or to obtain a court
order permitting the doctors to terminate life support. They chose the
latter route and the New Jersey Supreme Court eventually ruled in their
favor. It held that Karen’s father, as her judicially appointed guardian,
had the legal authority to authorize the termination of medical treatment
if termination is what Karen would have decided had she been able to do
so.111 The court also held that physicians who relied on a decision made
by a legal guardian would be immune from liability for so doing.112
The issues in the In re Quinlan case arose as the result of vast changes
in medical technology beginning in the 1950s, technology that could keep
people alive who would previously have inevitably died.113 The problem
was that some of these technologies were what is referred to as half-way
technologies because, while they could keep people alive, they frequently
could not restore them to the status quo ante or anything resembling it.114
Thus, Karen, while alive, was completely nonfunctional.115 And vegetative
state is an apt term; only Karen’s vegetative functions—respiration, circu-
lation, and metabolism—were still operative, all others had ceased.116
The vast majority of patients dependent on half-way technologies are by
no means in straits as dire as Karen was but their quality of life is often
seriously impaired—some depend on ventilators to breathe, dialysis to
106. Id. at 656–57. Ultimately, ventilatory support was withdrawn but Karen Quinlan
continued to breathe without it despite predictions to the contrary. She lived another ten
years and ultimately died of an untreated infection. See Karen Quinlan Dies After 10-Year
Coma: N.J. Case Prompted Historic Decision to Disconnect Respirator, L.A. TIMES (June
12, 1985, 12:00 AM), www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-06-12-mn-6097-story.html
[https://perma.cc/H74S-J5JB].
107. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 657.
108. Id. at 658–59.
109. Id. at 656.
110. Id. at 656–57.
111. Id. at 664.
112. Id. at 671.
113. See, e.g., Arthur S. Slutsky, History of Mechanical Ventilation, 191 AM. J. RESPIRA-
TORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 1106, 1108 (2015).
114. See Bryan Rowland, Communicating Past the Conflict: Solving the Medical Futility
Controversy with Process-Based Approaches, 14 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 271, 273
(2006).
115. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 655.
116. Id. at 654.
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cleanse their blood of toxins, or a vast array of medications that fre-
quently have serious side effects and can negatively interact with each
other. In many of these cases, the patients, if in possession of decision-
making capacity, no longer believe their lives to be worth living or they
may have, in advance of becoming so situated but in contemplation of the
possibility, issued directions to the same effect.
Quinlan was the first of many similar cases seeking to have life-sus-
taining medical treatment withheld or withdrawn.117 Resistance from
physicians to permit patients to forgo life-sustaining treatment caused
many patients (and families of patients who had lost decision-making ca-
pacity) to seek judicial relief to permit such treatment to be withheld or
withdrawn.118 By 1990, when the first of these cases reached the U.S. Su-
preme Court, there were approximately 100 similar cases that had been
decided by courts in about half of the states.119 In all likelihood, this was
just the tip of the iceberg. No one knows how many cases such as these
arise each year, but the numbers are at least in the tens, and possibly
hundreds, of thousands.
The case before the U.S. Supreme Court, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health, also involved a young woman in a persistent vege-
tative state.120 Although the Supreme Court’s ruling was not nearly as
comprehensive as those issued by the state courts in other end-of-life
cases—simply because the issue presented in the Cruzan case was nar-
rower than in most of the cases in the state courts—the fact that the high-
est court in the land issued a ruling in such a case was in itself
momentous. The Court’s decision acknowledged the right of patients to
forgo life-sustaining treatment and the right of the families of patients
who lacked decision-making capacity to forgo life-sustaining treatment
on their behalf in accordance with the law of whatever jurisdiction the
patient was in.121
D. THE “RIGHT TO DIE” AS A TRANSITIONAL STAGE TO ACTIVELY
HASTENING DEATH
The impact of the development of the right to die on the acceptance of
actively hastening death cannot be underestimated, for what is the right
to die but passively hastening death?
Prior to cases like Quinlan and Cruzan, there was tremendous legal
uncertainty about whether allowing patients to die—always with their
consent (either contemporaneously from a patient possessing decision-
making capacity or anticipatorily from a formerly competent patient) or
with the consent of their legally authorized representative—was legally
117. ALAN MEISEL, KATHY L. CERMINARA & THADDEUS MASON POPE, THE RIGHT TO
DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING § 1.09 (3d ed. 2019) (collecting cases).
118. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 261–62, 270 (1990).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 261.
121. Id. at 279–80.
2020] History of the Law of Assisted Dying 133
permissible or whether it constituted a criminal wrong, a civil wrong, or
both. After these cases, and especially after Cruzan, almost all doubt was
removed, especially if the participants in the process followed the stan-
dards and procedures established by the legislation and judicial decisions
of the relevant jurisdiction.122
In the relatively short span of a decade and a half between the Quinlan
decision in 1976 and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cruzan in 1990, a
consensus developed in state law about what the standards and proce-
dures should be—a consensus which has only solidified and been consoli-
dated in subsequent years—concerning the legal propriety of forgoing
life-sustaining medical treatment.123 Two aspects of this consensus are of
particular importance to the development of the law concerning actively
hastening death. The first has to do with medically supplied nutrition and
hydration. For almost ten years before the Cruzan case was decided, the
question of whether artificial nutrition and hydration—that is, nutrition
and hydration provided to a patient through a feeding tube—could be
withheld or withdrawn on the same basis as other medical treatments was
hotly debated.124 Even among those who viewed withholding or with-
drawing life-sustaining medical treatment as medically or morally legiti-
mate, or both, there was disagreement about whether withholding or
withdrawing a feeding tube was medically, morally, and legally legiti-
mate.125 A variety of arguments were urged as to why feeding tubes are
different from other forms of medical treatment. One argument was that
they are not a medical treatment because they provide basic sustenance,
and basic sustenance is not a medical treatment.126 Another argument
was that withholding or withdrawing a feeding tube results in starving a
patient to death and is therefore active euthanasia—killing the patient—
122. See id.
123. See generally Alan Meisel, The Legal Consensus About Forgoing Life-Sustaining
Treatment: Its Status and Its Prospects, 2 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 309, 319–26 (1992). To
briefly summarize this consensus:
• Patients possessing decision-making capacity have a virtually absolute right to re-
fuse medical treatment, whether life-sustaining or otherwise.
• Patients who lack decision-making capacity have the right to authorize the forgo-
ing of medical treatment, including life-sustaining medical treatment, through an
advance directive; that is, in a living will, health care power of attorney, or both,
and an advance directive may be oral as well as written.
• Patients who lack decision-making capacity but who have not issued an advance
directive have the right to have a surrogate (usually a close family member) make
a decision to forgo life-sustaining medical treatment on their behalf.
• Decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment ordinarily do not require prior judicial
approval.
• Medically supplied nutrition and hydration provided through a feeding tube may
be withheld or withdrawn on the same basis as any other medical treatment.
• Although forgoing life-sustaining treatment—i.e., passively hastening death or pas-
sive euthanasia—is legally permissible with appropriate legal authorization, as far
as the law is concerned there is a bright line between passively hastening death by
forgoing treatment and actively hastening death, and the latter is absolutely
prohibited.
124. Id. at 325.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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unlike forgoing medical treatment which merely allows nature to take its
course.127
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Cruzan in a concurring
opinion by Justice O’Connor.128 Justice O’Connor relied on an opinion of
the American Medical Association stating that feeding tubes are complex
medical devices and are often surgically implanted, and so they may be
withheld or withdrawn just as any other medical treatment, as long as
there is proper legal authorization from a patient or a patient’s surro-
gate.129 Her view was that requiring a patient to have a feeding tube—a
patient who did not want one or whose legal representative did not au-
thorize it—constituted an intrusion on the bodily integrity of the patient,
which, if practiced or authorized by the state, was a violation of the right
to be free of unwanted physical restraint—an aspect of the right to liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.130
The second aspect of the consensus relevant to development of the law
concerning actively hastening death is the so-called “bright line” between
passively and actively hastening death. The Supreme Court’s Cruzan de-
cision did not condemn, and therefore implicitly approved, the practice of
allowing patients to die upon their request or the request of their legally
authorized representatives.131 In doing so, it put the Court’s imprimatur
on the decisions of the state courts to this same effect. By 1990, this was
relatively uncontroversial; nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s ruling is
very important because of the reasoning that the state courts used in ar-
riving at this conclusion.
One of the reasons that Karen Quinlan’s physicians refused to take her
off life support when her parents requested it was their fear of being held
liable for criminal homicide—that is, for killing Karen should she die
when ventilatory support was withdrawn.132 In its reasoning to the con-
clusion that there would be no criminal liability under these circum-
stances, the New Jersey Supreme Court, and other state courts in
subsequent cases, put forth a number of explanations.133 One was that, if
a patient died under these circumstances, the cause of death would be the
patient’s underlying illness or injury and not the actions of the physicians
who withheld or withdrew treatment.134 In the same vein, another was
that in such situations the doctors were allowing nature to take its
course.135 Yet another was that there would be no criminal liability be-
cause, when life-sustaining medical treatment was forgone, the intent was
to honor the patient’s wishes and thus to honor the patient’s legal right to
127. Id. at 326–27.
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be free of unwanted interference with bodily integrity, which is what non-
consensual medical treatment is.136 Yet another was that the doctors
would not have killed Karen, they would have only let her die.
All of these explanations have been subject to a great deal of criticism
based on their logic, their conflict with fundamental legal principles of
criminal law, or both. Nonetheless, one or more of these explanations has
been accepted by every appellate court that has considered this matter. In
addition, advance directive and surrogate decision-making statutes en-
acted by state legislatures have been grounded in the same reasoning.
Most of these statutes—which permit (1) patients in possession of deci-
sion-making capacity to decide what treatments they would or would not
want in the event they lose capacity or to appoint a proxy to make deci-
sions for them if they lose capacity, and/or (2) patients to authorize
named individuals to make decisions for patients who lack capacity and
did not make provisions in advance for decision making under these con-
ditions—specifically prohibit mercy killing, euthanasia, or assisted sui-
cide.137 Consequently, it is now well accepted in American law that there
is no criminal liability (and no civil liability) for a patient’s death resulting
from withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment as
long as there is legally valid authorization from the patient (either con-
temporaneously from a patient possessing decision-making capacity or
anticipatorily from a formerly competent patient) or from the surrogate
of a patient who lacks decision-making capacity.138
These rationales were intended to draw a clear and bright line between
the practice authorized by these cases—what is referred to by courts as
“forgoing life-sustaining treatment”139 or “withholding or withdrawing
treatment”140 but which might just as well be called “passively hastening
death” or “passive euthanasia”—and actively hastening death through
mercy killing or by assisting the patient in committing suicide. The former
honors patients’ rights; the latter impermissibly kills patients and consti-
tutes criminal homicide or criminally abetting suicide.
VI. THE GULF BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE
The increasing acceptance in law, in policy, in medical ethics, and in
public opinion of the practice of withholding or withdrawing life-sus-
taining medical treatment—that is, passively hastening death or passive
euthanasia—has undeniably had a major impact on the acceptance of ac-
tively hastening death. It is difficult to imagine that nine U.S. jurisdic-
tions141 would have legalized physician-aided dying had the groundwork
136. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 288–89 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
137. MEISEL, CERMINARA & POPE, supra note 117, § 7.07.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Collins v. Lake Forest Hosp., 821 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Ill. 2004).
140. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 65–66 (Wis. 1992).
141. The nine jurisdictions are California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, Ore-
gon, Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia. See Death with Dignity Acts,
supra note 67.
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for it not been laid by the acceptance of passively hastening death. How-
ever, that has not been the only factor responsible for this. Another has
been the increasing realization and publicity about the gulf between the-
ory and practice in actively hastening death. For all the years—indeed
centuries—that mercy killing and assisted suicide have been treated as
criminal, they have also been practiced, and often with legal impunity.142
This increasingly came to light in the twentieth century in two ways. The
first was through individual legal cases prosecuting individuals who have
committed these offenses and the second was through survey research.
A. PROSECUTION OF LAY PEOPLE
Judging from newspaper accounts, there have been a large number of
investigations into and prosecutions of individuals accused of mercy kill-
ing and/or assisting seriously ill people with ending their lives.143 Very
few, however, have reached the appellate court level, which would have
permitted them to be tallied as “reported cases,” to use the legal vernacu-
lar.144 There is also no readily available means for collecting data on ac-
quittals of people charged with mercy killing or aiding suicide. Only if the
defendant is found guilty can there be an appeal, which is a prerequisite
to the case being officially reported and enrolled in legal annals.
Based on the reported cases, we know that there are extremely few
criminal convictions.145 We also know from news accounts that there are
a far greater number of instances of individuals who engage in mercy kill-
ing or assisted suicide.146 The fact that there are very few reported cases
is an indication that there are very few convictions (because acquittals are
not appealable)—and “very few” truly understates the order of magni-
tude, because there are probably only a handful or less in the entire
United States in the twentieth century.147
What this means is that most cases are being disposed of through the
exercise of discretion at one or more points in the criminal process,148
142. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711 (1997) (“[F]or over 700
years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved
of both suicide and assisting suicide.”).
143. See, e.g., Tony Perry, Man, 75, May Face Charges in Mercy Killing of Wife, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 13, 1999), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1999-oct-13-mn-21770-
story.html [https://perma.cc/Y7JN-G6NG].
144. Ronald B. Standler, Annotated Legal Cases on Physician-Assisted Suicide in the
USA 18–24 (July 29, 2012) (collecting cases) (on file with author).
145. Id.
146. Beyond Brittany: Assisted Suicides Happen in Every State, Insiders Say, NBC
NEWS, https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/beyond-brittany-assisted-suicides-
happen-every-state-insiders-say-n226966 (last updated Oct. 18, 2014).
147. See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690, 693–94 (Mich. 1920); Gilbert v. State,
487 So. 2d 1185, 1192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
148. See Griffith v. State, 548 So. 2d 244, 247 n.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that
the holding that there is no legal defense of mercy killing “does not mean that the circum-
stances of so-called ‘mercy killings’ such as this may not be considered in prosecutorial
decisions made by a grand jury or the state attorney concerning whether or on what charge
an indictment or information should be returned . . . . Furthermore, it cannot impede a
petit jury’s exercise of its so-called ‘pardon power’ in finding the defendant guilty of a
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and there are many such points at which this may occur. At each such
point, often despite rather clear evidence that the accused person did en-
gage in mercy killing or assisted suicide, the relevant legal authority may
ignore or underplay the import of that evidence. Starting at the beginning
of a criminal prosecution and going toward the end, these are some of the
more important of such points:
• The coroner or medical examiner may record a death as natural.
• If the police are called upon to investigate the death, they may con-
clude that there was no “foul play.”
• If the police refer the case to the prosecutorial authority, the prose-
cutor may decide not to prosecute.
• If the prosecutor decides to prosecute, a plea bargain may be struck
with the defendant or a trial court judge may dismiss the charges.
• If a trial occurs without a jury, the court may refuse to convict with-
out giving any reason for so doing.
• If there is a jury trial, the jury may refuse to convict even if the law
and facts direct otherwise (a process known as jury nullification).
• Either a judge or a jury may conclude that the defendant was le-
gally insane at the time of the offense and enter a verdict of not
guilty by reason of mental illness.149
• If the jury does convict, the judge may sentence the defendant so
leniently that the defendant does not appeal, such as a sentence to
community service or a sentence to “time served,” or may place the
defendant on probation rather than in confinement.
• A defendant sentenced to confinement may be granted rapid parole
or receive a pardon.
These are merely some of the points in the criminal process at which
discretion may be exercised to impose no penalty or a minor penalty even
when there is clear technical guilt. There are others, and there is the op-
portunity to plea bargain throughout much of the criminal process.
The lack of convictions in comparison with the number of suspected
mercy killings and assisted suicides clearly demonstrates that criminal jus-
tice authorities and juries (i.e., the public) are extremely reluctant to im-
pose any penalty on someone whom they deem to have engaged in a
merciful act—whether by directly killing or by aiding another—resulting
in the death of a person who is seriously ill, chronically ill and infirm, or
terminally ill and suffering greatly. This is even more likely to be the case
if the victim has requested his own demise,150 thereby giving lie to the
maxim that consent is no defense to a crime, at least in this context.
lesser or of no offense even though the facts may justify (or even require) a greater offense
under the letter of the law.”). See generally LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 3.6, at 243; Ann
Alpers, Criminal Act or Palliative Care? Prosecutions Involving the Care of the Dying, 26
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 308 (1998).
149. See Arval A. Morris, Voluntary Euthanasia, 45 WASH. L. REV. 239, 242 (1970).
150. See George C. Garbesi, The Law of Assisted Suicide, 3 ISSUES L. & MED. 93, 111
(1987); Gurney, supra note 86, at 255–56; Morris, supra note 149, at 265–66; Williams,
supra note 95, at 2.
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B. PROSECUTION OF HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS
Much the same can be said of investigations and prosecutions of health
care professionals. Prior to the 1990s and the advent of Dr. Kevorkian,
there do not appear to be any reported cases in the legal annals of the
prosecution of a physician for mercy killing. There are some newspaper
accounts of physicians being prosecuted for mercy killings, perhaps the
best known being the 1950 trial of Dr. Hermann Sander in New Hamp-
shire.151 Because Dr. Sander was found not guilty by a jury,152 there
could be no appeal of the case, so there is no formal reported record.
However, it is known that the jury acquitted on the ground that there was
inadequate proof that Dr. Sander’s actions had caused the patient’s
death, despite the fact that he “dictated into the hospital record a state-
ment that he had injected ten cubic centimeters of air four times into the
veins of an incurably-ill, suffering cancer patient and that ‘she expired
within ten minutes after this started . . . .’”153 That is not to say that there
have not been other investigations, threatened prosecutions, and actual
prosecutions. However, it is very difficult to know the number and the
details for the same reason that it is difficult to know about the incidence
of prosecutions of lay people.
Furthermore, surveys of health care professionals—primarily physi-
cians and nurses—indicate that they actively aid patients’ deaths far more
frequently than the reported legal cases or the news accounts suggest.154
Despite the fact that it is difficult to be certain that respondents to these
surveys are honestly reporting their conduct, it is likely that, if they are
not honest, the bias is toward understating the extent of their participa-
tion in ending a patient’s life, thus suggesting that the number of such
cases is even greater than the surveys suggest.
VII. CONTEMPORARY EFFORTS TO LEGALIZE “DEATH
WITH DIGNITY”
Momentum toward the legalization of mercy killing and/or assisted sui-
cide—resulting in the enactment of death-with-dignity legislation and
favorable judicial rulings—increased dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s
as the result of the culmination of the trends previously discussed, but
there is more to it than that. A number of other factors added to the
momentum.
Serious efforts at legalization have overwhelmingly entailed only physi-
cian-aided dying and have abjured the legalization of mercy killing or aid-
151. See Rick Holmes, Before Kevorkian Controversy, There Was Derry’s Dr. Sander,
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in-dying provided by anyone other than a physician. The reason for this is
primarily prudential and, to a lesser extent, ideological. It has been the
view of those advocating for legalization that they stood a much better
chance of success if they were to take one small step at a time, just as had
been done in the legalization of passively hastening death. Had those
seeking to recognize the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment
(i.e., passively hastening death) also advocated for actively hastening
death, it is far more likely that they would have failed—not only to legal-
ize actively hastening death but also to legalize passively hastening death.
Similarly, many of those who would have liked to legalize mercy killing
realized that they were ultimately more likely to achieve this result if they
were first to attain the legalization of physician-aided dying. However,
some who advocated only for the legalization of physician-aided dying
but not mercy killing did so because they believed that the former was
morally defensible and that the latter was not.
A. POPULAR ACCOUNTS OF ACTIVELY HASTENING DEATH
A number of popular accounts of actively hastening death provoked
significant public interest in the subject in the latter part of the twentieth
century. The first, in 1979, was Jean’s Way by the British newspaper re-
porter Derek Humphry about how he aided his wife who was terminally
ill with cancer to end her life.155 Afterwards, Humphry received numer-
ous pleas requesting information on the drugs that his wife had used to
end her life and numerous invitations to speak to groups, including medi-
cal schools in the English-speaking world.156 “The size and enthusiasm of
the crowds astonished him.”157 He is quoted as saying: “My journalistic
antenae [sic] told me this was going to be a big subject.”158 Humphry
remarried and moved to the United States with his new American wife
where he abandoned journalism and started the Hemlock Society, which
advocated for the legalization of physician-assisted dying.159 He subse-
quently published two other books, which provided increasingly greater
amounts of specific information about how to end one’s life—Let Me Die
Before I Wake in 1982 and Final Exit in 1991.160 The latter was a detailed
guide, including the names of drugs and the amounts needed to end one’s
life.161 It also contained information on subterfuges that could be used to
155. DEREK HUMPHRY, JEAN’S WAY: A LOVE STORY (1978).
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obtain these drugs from physicians,162 and it created a storm of protest.163
Another account of mercy killing was a commentary in the Journal of
the American Medical Association, “It’s Over, Debbie,” published in
1988.164 Although written anonymously, the author claimed to be a resi-
dent physician on overnight call in a hospital.165 A nurse summoned him
in the middle of the night, telling him that a patient was having difficulty
sleeping and asking him to see the patient, a twenty-year-old woman dy-
ing from ovarian cancer.166 All treatments had failed, she was clearly in
the end stages of the illness, and she was now only receiving palliative
care.167 The author wrote that “[h]er only words to me were, ‘Let’s get
this over with.’”168 On the basis of that statement, the resident adminis-
tered a dose of morphine to her that caused her breathing to slow down
and eventually to stop.169
This article engendered a huge debate in both the popular and profes-
sional press.170 Some of the debate was focused on the facts of the case:
the author was a resident who did not know the patient and knew only
scant information about her based on her paper medical record; he inter-
preted the phrase, “Let’s get this over with,” as a request to be
euthanized when its meaning was ambiguous; he made no effort to clarify
what she meant by the phrase; it was not at all clear that the patient pos-
sessed decision-making capacity; and the resident’s response to the pa-
tient’s request was made in haste.171 Other objections were raised on the
simple grounds that what the physician did was illegal and therefore
should not have been done. Others argued that even if it was not illegal, it
violated the ethical precepts of the medical profession.172 A prosecutor in
Chicago sought to subpoena the records of the journal to attempt to as-
certain the identity of the physician and presumably to initiate criminal
proceedings, but a court denied the request and that ended the matter, as
far as the law was concerned.173
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(Aug. 14, 1991), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1991-08-14-9103280566-
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A few years later, another case engendered similar public debate and
almost led to a criminal prosecution. Dr. Timothy Quill, a Rochester,
New York physician (and later a leader in the movement to legalize phy-
sician-aided dying), wrote about providing a patient of his who was dying
of leukemia with adequate barbiturates to end her life, which she eventu-
ally did.174 What was unique about this case is that Dr. Quill wrote an
article, published in probably the most prestigious medical journal in the
United States—the New England Journal of Medicine—about this mat-
ter.175 Unlike the piece about Debbie which some claimed was fictional
and designed only to provoke discussion of physician-aided dying, Dr.
Quill identified himself and took full responsibility for what he did—
practically inviting legal inquiry—in a sensitively written and detailed
way.176 The facts of this case were abundantly clear, including the clarity
of the patient’s request for medications to end her life.177 There was no
doubt that she possessed decision-making capacity and the decision was
not made hastily either by the doctor or the patient,178 as had been the
case with Debbie. And still a grand jury declined to indict.179
The third, and probably best known, factor in bringing the issue of ac-
tively hastening death to the public’s attention was the activities of Dr.
Jack Kevorkian, a Michigan pathologist—a doctor who deals with ana-
tomical specimens and corpses rather than live patients—who invented a
“suicide machine” by which patients could self-administer a lethal combi-
nation of drugs or carbon monoxide supplied by Dr. Kevorkian.180 His
activities, which began in 1990, faced intense criticism and opposition
from physicians and the public alike, in part because of his somewhat
strange persona and the manner in which he conducted his activities—
originally from a dilapidated minivan.181 Other factors contributing to the
condemnation of his activities were the fact that many of the people who
patronized his services were not terminally ill, he lacked the professional
skills and training to determine their decision-making capacity, and he
failed to refer some patients to pain specialists.182
The criminal authorities in Michigan attempted to prosecute him on a
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number of occasions for many years,183 but their efforts were for naught,
primarily because there was no law in Michigan making aiding suicide a
crime. Not until he changed from providing the means for 130 patients to
end their own lives184 to actually injecting a patient with lethal drugs—
with a video recording of the injection shown on a nationally televised
program185—was Dr. Kevorkian finally convicted of a crime (second-de-
gree murder) and imprisoned for a sentence of ten to twenty-five
years.186
Although Dr. Kevorkian is an excellent example of how physician-
aided dying should not be practiced, his activities did have the salutary
effect—because of the widespread publicity over a period of almost ten
years—of engendering a great deal of public debate about the subject. If
nothing else, the manner in which he carried out his activities provided a
strong argument for the kinds of safeguards that needed to be incorpo-
rated into laws legalizing physician-aided dying should they be enacted.
B. EFFECT OF LEGALIZATION IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Legislation. Another development that has influenced the movement
toward legalization of physician-aided dying in the United States has
been legalization of mercy killing and/or physician-assisted dying in other
countries, most notably the Netherlands. The process in the Netherlands
took place over a period of several decades, beginning in 1973.187 It be-
gan informally by individual physicians without any legal protection and
eventually resulted in the enactment of legislation recognizing, confirm-
ing, and legalizing the practice in 2002.188 Belgium adopted similar legis-
lation, also in 2002,189 as did Luxembourg in 2009.190
Judicial Rulings. Legalization has also occurred through the judicial
process. In February 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that com-
petent adults suffering intolerably and permanently have the right to phy-
sician-aided dying.191 The Constitutional Court of Colombia issued a
number of rulings between 1997 and 2015 aimed at legalizing physician-
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aided dying.192
Nonprosecution. Two other European countries have become more tol-
erant of the practice without legislation legalizing it. Switzerland is one of
them. Under a 1942 provision of the Swiss penal code, which has been
brought to greater public attention as the movement for legalization in
other countries has gained momentum, assisting suicide is criminal only if
the party providing the assistance acts out of a selfish motive.193 As a
consequence, Switzerland has become a destination for what is some-
times referred to as “suicide tourism.”194 This is especially true for the
British because, in Britain, physician-aided dying remains a crime despite
numerous efforts at legalization.195 Nonetheless, even the British authori-
ties have taken a more lenient view of the practice. As the result of a
ruling in a case decided by the House of Lords in 2009196 requiring the
Director of Public Prosecutions “to clarify what his position is as to the
factors that he regards as relevant for and against prosecution” in cases of
encouraging and assisting suicide, a lengthy and detailed set of guidelines
has been issued to clarify the circumstances under which a prosecution
for aiding a patient in committing suicide would occur.197
While not directly affecting American law, developments in other
countries have helped to shape public and professional opinion in the
United States. For one thing, they have helped to keep the issue in the
news, generating discussion in the popular press and in the journals of
health care professionals and lawyers. They have also served as an inspi-
ration to those American organizations with missions to further (or to
oppose) legalization efforts.
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Not all of the effects of developments abroad have weighed in favor of
more widespread legalization; some have had the opposite effect. Reports
of abuse in the Netherlands,198 whether verifiable or not199—that mercy
killing has been applied to mentally ill individuals with questionable deci-
sion-making capacity and infants and children who clearly did not possess
decision-making capacity—have helped to strengthen the claim that le-
galization of voluntary physician-aided dying for patients with decision-
making capacity would inevitably erode the requirements of voluntari-
ness and decision-making capacity. Furthermore, after legalization in
Belgium of mercy killing for competent adults who voluntarily request it,
the Belgian parliament enacted another statute extending mercy killing to
children.200 The fact that this law includes safeguards—“the patient must
be conscious of their decision and understand the meaning of euthana-
sia”; “[t]he request must have been approved by the child’s parents and
medical team”; “[t]heir illness must be terminal”; “[t]hey must be in great
pain, with no available treatment to alleviate their distress”; the request
must be voluntarily made by the child; and the child must have the matur-
ity to make the decision, as confirmed by a psychologist201—did little to
quiet the uproar that this legislation caused both in Belgium and abroad,
and the law provided additional ammunition for opponents of legaliza-
tion of any kind of death-with-dignity legislation in the United States.202
C. THE ROLE OF ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS
The events and factors previously described—the increasing accept-
ance by courts and legislatures of the practice of passively hastening
death; increased public debate about legalization arising from the publi-
cation of various books and articles; and the legalization of physician-
aided dying in other countries—probably would not have had the impact
on legalization in the United States that they did had it not also been for
the existence and efforts of several organizations advocating for legisla-
tion and undertaking litigation to legalize some form of physician-aided
dying.
Organizations advocating for what has been called “euthanasia,” “the
right to die,” “death with dignity,” and similar terms, originated in Britain
198. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997).
199. See id. at 786 (Souter, J., concurring).
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in 1935 with the formation of the Voluntary Euthanasia Legalization So-
ciety.203 A similar organization, the Euthanasia Society of America, was
founded in 1938.204 Neither organization made any real progress in the
legal acceptance of physician-aided dying, nor did they make much head-
way in mobilizing public opinion. In the late 1960s, the American organi-
zation refocused its efforts on advocating for passively hastening death.205
At some point thereafter, it changed its name to the Society for the Right
to Die, which—along with a similar organization founded in 1967, the
Euthanasia Educational Council (which changed its name to Concern for
Dying in 1978)—promoted public awareness of the growing legal accept-
ance of the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment (passive eu-
thanasia).206 The Society for the Right to Die and Concern for Dying
merged in 1990 to form the National Council on Death and Dying.207
While these organizations were promoting the right to refuse life-sus-
taining medical treatment, other organizations were formed to promote
the mission of legalizing actively hastening death, the mission that the
Euthanasia Society of America had abandoned somewhat earlier. Derek
Humphry’s Hemlock Society was founded in 1980, changed its name to
End of Life Choices in 2002, and merged with the Compassion in Dying
Federation in 2007 to become Compassion & Choices.208 Concurrent with
this merger, a splinter group formed another organization, Final Exit Net-
work, devoted not only to advocacy but to providing assistance to people
who wished to end their lives.209 The final player among these organiza-
tions is Death with Dignity, which evolved out of the Oregon Death with
Dignity Legal Defense and Education Center.210 It, along with Compas-
sion & Choices, has been in the forefront of the contemporary efforts to
legalize physician-aided dying through litigation and legislation. Despite
the frequent mergers, dissolutions, infighting, and upheavals among these
organizations, they managed to make significant progress toward legaliza-
tion of physician-aided dying beginning in the 1990s.
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D. VOTER INITIATIVES
There was enough momentum behind the legalization of physician-
aided dying that efforts began in the late 1980s and early 1990s to put the
issue before voters. Many bills had been introduced in numerous state
legislatures for many years—going back to the late 1930s in New York
and Nebraska211—to enact some form of physician-aided dying. None
had ever come anywhere near succeeding, and contemporary proponents
realized that, at least at that time, there was virtually no likelihood of
success in state legislatures, so they chose the alternative route of going
directly to the voting public.
The first such attempt was in California in 1988,212 but proponents
were unable to secure enough signatures to put the matter on the ballot.
An effort in Washington state in 1991213 and in California in 1992214 suc-
ceeded in getting the matter on the ballot but were defeated at least in
part because they would have also authorized mercy killing.
Having learned from the failed approach in Washington and California,
proponents gained enough voter signatures to put a physician-aided dying
measure on the Oregon ballot in 1994 but did not attempt to legalize
mercy killing.215 Realizing that the word suicide was toxic, they titled the
initiative “Death with Dignity.”216 Despite strong opposition from physi-
cian groups and the Catholic Church manifested largely through TV ad-
vertising, the measure was narrowly approved by voters.217 Its
implementation was delayed by three years because of a constitutional
challenge in federal court218 and a second voter initiative to repeal the
first one.219 After the judicial challenge was resolved in favor of the initi-
ative220 and after the repeal vote was overwhelmingly defeated,221 the
law was approved in 1994 and went into effect in November 1997.
Various advocacy organizations sought to replicate the Oregon victory
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in other states— Michigan in 1998,222 Maine in 2000,223 and Massachu-
setts in 2012.224 Despite initially favorable polling results indicating that
voters in each of these states supported the legalization of physician-
aided dying, all of these efforts failed, possibly because of widespread,
last-minute TV advertising portraying the purported dangers of legaliza-
tion, despite (as will be discussed below) the failure of these dangers to
manifest themselves in Oregon over the course of many years.
E. LITIGATION
Federal Courts. While these efforts to legalize physician-aided dying
through voter initiatives were occurring, proponents of legalization
sought a more sweeping approach through litigation, which in two cases,
had it been successful, would have resulted in nationwide legalization. In
the early 1990s, lawsuits were filed in federal courts in Washington
state225 and New York226 challenging the constitutionality of those states’
laws that criminalized assisted suicide—insofar as those laws applied to
competent, terminally ill patients seeking assistance from a licensed phy-
sician in ending their lives.
In the Washington case, the trial court upheld the petitioners’ claims
that the statute criminalizing assisted suicide, as applied to competent,
terminally ill patients, denied them their rights to the due process and
equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution.227 By contrast, the federal trial court in New York denied simi-
lar claims.228 In both cases, the losing parties appealed to the appropriate
federal appeals courts and the appeals courts upheld the petitioners’
claims. In the Washington case, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court’s decision,229 but
the court en banc reinstated the trial court’s decision, resoundingly hold-
ing that the Washington law prohibiting assisted suicide violated the peti-
tioners’ claim to due process of law.230 In the New York case, although
the result was the same, the legal basis was different with the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit holding that the New York law violated
the petitioners’ claim to the equal protection of the law.231
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The losing parties in both cases sought review by the U.S. Supreme
Court, which granted review and then decided the cases together in
1997.232 The result was not what proponents of legalization had hoped
for, with the Court reversing both appellate court decisions and holding
that there was no federal constitutional right to have a physician provide
competent, terminally ill patients with a prescription for a lethal dose of
medication.233 However, the Supreme Court did hold that while the Con-
stitution did not prohibit state bans on physician-aided dying, it did not
forbid states from repealing those bans if they so choose.234 In other
words, legalization of physician-aided dying did not violate any constitu-
tional protections, as the opponents of legalization had argued in the case
challenging the Oregon law.235 Furthermore, on the side of the ledger
more favorable to proponents, a majority of the Justices suggested, but
did not hold, that physicians were permitted to administer palliative
medications that might have the effect of ending a terminally ill patient’s
life as long as it was not the physician’s intent to do so.236 Because the
Court’s holding was premised on the assumption that terminally ill pa-
tients could receive palliative care to treat pain, the Court also suggested
that if in fact patients experience significant barriers to obtaining pain
relief, the Court might be willing to reconsider its decision.237
State Courts. Physician-aided dying became legal in Montana in 2009
when the state supreme court ruled that, although the state constitution
did not guarantee such a right, “nothing in Montana Supreme Court pre-
cedent or Montana statutes indicat[es] that physician aid in dying is
against public policy.”238 Thus, while physician-aided dying is not illegal
in Montana, there is no statutory procedure for carrying it out as there is
in those states where such a right has been embodied in legislation. Sub-
sequent efforts in the Montana legislature to overrule the effect of this
court decision were unsuccessful.239
There have been failed constitutional challenges to laws, as applied to
terminally ill patients, that make assisted suicide a crime in state courts in
Alaska, California, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Montana, New Mex-
ico, and New York.240 It can be expected that similar lawsuits will be
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initiated in other state courts—indeed, one is pending in the Massachu-
setts courts.241
F. LEGISLATION
As mentioned before, attempts to get state legislatures to enact legisla-
tion to legalize physician-aided dying have been uniformly unsuccessful
until recently, probably because legislation of this sort is considered, even
by many legislators who support it, to be highly toxic. Although public
opinion polls usually show significant, if not overwhelming, public sup-
port for legalization,242 the opposition is highly vocal and well-organized,
and legislators fear retribution at the polls from opponents of legaliza-
tion. They have learned this lesson from several decades of “abortion
wars” dealing with another highly controversial topic and similar oppo-
nents. At best, a few legislators have been willing to introduce legislation
to legalize physician-aided dying either as a pet project of their own or in
order to please a particular group of constituents, but they have known in
advance that it is a lost cause; rarely do these bills get out of committee
for a vote by the full legislature.243
This almost changed in 2002, when the Hawaii legislature came within
three votes of approving physician-aided dying legislation.244 It did, in
fact, change in Vermont in 2013, where the legislature approved a bill to
legalize physician-aided dying and the governor signed it.245 Victory in
Vermont, however, did not necessarily augur a widespread acceptance of
similar legislation in other states, largely because some of the characteris-
tics of Vermont are unusual: a liberal electorate, a very small legislature,
and a very small and inexpensive media market all made success in the
legislature more feasible than in most other states. Nonetheless, a state
with a large legislature and a very expensive media market—California—
followed suit in 2015.246 There are bills in many state legislatures in any
given session to legalize physician-aided dying,247 and after the victory in
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California, perhaps the road to legalization via the legislative route is
more likely to succeed in the future than it has in the past—though it is
still likely to be gradual and sporadic.
The foremost obstacle to legalization of physician-aided dying of any
kind—whether mercy killing or physician-assisted suicide—has been the
numerous arguments put forth by opponents, some of which have at least
prima facie validity, some of which are easily dispensed with, and some of
which have been disproved by experience in those states where physician-
aided dying has been legalized.248
The most basic of these arguments is that killing is always wrong and,
when it is put that way, it certainly seems to be true. But as mentioned
earlier, the law has long accepted justifications and excuses for killing,
thereby implying that not all killing is always wrong. There is nothing to
prevent the carving out of another exception through appropriate legal
channels, which is exactly what has happened in those states where physi-
cian-aided dying has been legalized.
Another important argument against legalization concerns the volunta-
riness of the decision to end one’s life.249 It is contended that people who
are seriously ill, the elderly, and the infirm are pressured to end their lives
by pain, depression, despondency, and a fear of being a burden to
others.250 Consequently, it is claimed, they are incapable of making a
truly voluntary decision.251 Closely related, and sometimes overlapping,
is the claim that people who wish to end their lives lack the mental capac-
ity to make this decision and the medications that they may be taking to
address pain, depression, and despondency may further compromise their
decision-making capacity.252 The most extreme version of this argument
is that suicide is an inherently irrational act and, thus, those seeking to
end their lives—either by themselves or with the assistance of others—
are ipso facto incompetent to make such a decision. Another related ar-
gument is that as palliative care and the education of physicians in pallia-
tive care techniques have improved and become more widespread,
physicians are capable of controlling or even eliminating those factors
that impel terminally ill patients to seek to end their lives.
Another traditional argument against legalization is that diagnosis and
prognosis are uncertain. A person diagnosed as being terminally ill may
not actually be so, may live far longer than the average person with such a
diagnosis, and/or may have a far better quality of life than is the norm. A
closely related argument is that a new treatment may be discovered that
will render the terminal diagnosis uncertain or incorrect.
The claim is also made that permitting doctors to either prescribe a
lethal dose of medication for a patient or to administer it directly would
248. Many of these arguments are discussed (and refuted) in Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
249. Id. at 825–26.
250. See id.
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cause patients to distrust doctors, for they would be uncertain whether
their doctors were seeking to better their condition or to end their
lives.253 Would it not, it is sometimes added, be easier for doctors dealing
with difficult cases to end their patients’ lives than to engage in the time-
consuming and energy-consuming activities of trying to improve their
well-being?
Another argument against legalization is the “wedge” or “slippery
slope” argument applicable to almost any policy change, not just legaliza-
tion of physician-aided dying.254 This is the argument that if society weak-
ens a prohibition on some activity deemed to be undesirable, it will
inevitably lead to the weakening of the prohibition on even more undesir-
able activities. In this context, this means that if, for example, physicians
are allowed to prescribe medications for competent, terminally ill pa-
tients who made a voluntary decision to end their lives, the claim would
soon be made that it would be unfair to deny assistance to dying to peo-
ple who are no longer able to self-administer the prescribed medications;
therefore, physicians ought to be permitted to directly administer the
medications in such circumstances, thus transforming physician-aided dy-
ing into mercy killing. The most extreme version of the slippery slope
argument is that once any kind of aid-in-dying is legalized, it will inevita-
bly lead, over time, to the practices that the Nazis engaged in—the invol-
untary euthanasia of those deemed by medical or governmental
authorities, or even family members, to be unfit to live.255
Perhaps the most ironic argument against legalization is the claim that
because doctors are already performing mercy killings they deem to be
justified, it is not necessary to legalize the practice. This argument suffers
from several flaws. One is that because the practice is still illegal doctors
never know if or when they might be investigated and prosecuted. This
means that virtually all mercy killings will remain surreptitious; therefore,
it cannot be determined whether they were voluntary, nonvoluntary, or
even involuntary, and thus whether they may have been abusive. Another
flaw is that this seeks to make a virtue of hypocrisy, and another is that it
is inequitable and arbitrary. Those patients who are “well connected”
may be able to find a physician who will honor their wishes, but others—
probably most—will not.
G. THE EFFECTS OF LEGALIZATION
Physician-aided dying is now legal in nine U.S. jurisdictions.256 The Or-
egon Health Authority has kept very detailed records of the results of
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act since it went into effect in November
1997, and Washington state has kept similar records since legalization
there in 2009. The experience in both states has been similar and rather
253. Id. at 827–30.
254. Id. at 830–32.
255. Id. at 830.
256. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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clearly puts to rest most of the arguments that opponents of legalization
have made—or at least those that can be settled by empirical data. The
most relevant data—namely, those relating to the traditional and more
contemporary concerns that opponents of legalization have expressed—
do not support and, in fact, dispel the concerns of opponents.257
The characteristics of the people who have availed themselves of these
two death-with-dignity laws do not support the concerns of opponents of
legalization. They are predominantly not members of minority racial
groups; they are well-educated; and they have had health insurance and
thus were not driven to end their lives by a want of medical care.258 Most
who needed it were receiving adequate pain relief—that is, they were
enrolled in hospice care and were not motivated to seek physician-aided
dying because of unremitting pain, which might have been adequately
treated by traditional palliative care medicine.259 Rather, they sought to
end their lives mostly because of existential issues including “loss of au-
tonomy (91.7%), decreasing ability to participate in activities that made
life enjoyable (90.5%), and loss of dignity (66.7%).”260 Furthermore,
there is no evidence in either state that patients have been pressured into
seeking physician-aided dying either by their physicians or their families
nor that they lacked the capacity to make a decision to avail themselves
of physician-aided dying. There has also been no discernible effort in ei-
ther state to extend the reach of the law to people who lack decision-
making capacity or who are unable to self-administer the lethal dose of
medication.
Also significant is the fact that although there has been a slow move-
ment toward legalization, at the same time there has been an increasing
emphasis on and funding for making hospice services available to people
at the end of life and on educating physicians about hospice care so that
physician-aided dying is not the only option that terminally ill people
have.261
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VIII. CONCLUSION: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS
Prediction, at least for those who do not have a crystal ball, is always an
uncertain proposition and even more so when the prediction concerns
human behavior. What appears to be the case, however, is that there is a
slow but steady march not only in the United States but also in Canada
and Europe toward the legalization of physician-aided dying. It is likely
that there will be setbacks along the way—just as there have been since
the passage of the Oregon law in 1994—but proponents of legalization
will recover and score victories elsewhere. Because of the nature of the
activity involved—the purposeful ending of human life—there will always
be some fundamental opposition which may prevail in some places but be
overcome in others, just as the opposition to passively hastening death
has slowly melted away, leaving a small residue of opposition. What is
most likely to derail this trend is verifiable reports of serious abuse—the
provision of a prescription for a lethal dose of medication to people who
lack decision-making capacity, the pressuring of people to end their lives,
or the direct administration of a lethal dose of medication where only aid-
in-dying has been legalized, and of course, involuntary euthanasia.
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